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ABSTRACT: Classical philosophical Daoism as it is expressed in the Dao-De-Jing and 
the Zhuang-Zi is often interpreted as lacking a capacity for critique and resistance. Since 
these capacities are taken to be central components of Enlightenment reason and action, it 
would follow that Daoism is incompatible with Enlightenment. This interpretation is being 
refuted by way of developing a constructive dialogue between the enlightenment traditions of 
critical theory and recent philosophy of action from a Daoist perspective. Daoism's 
normative naturalism does neither rest on a primitivist call for a return to the past, nor does 
it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and 
emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical 
theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key 
normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the 
present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei 
allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency.       
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The legend of the origin of the proto-Daoist text Dao-De-Jing (道德經) dates back to 
the historian Sima Qian (145-85 BC). It is likely to be more fiction than fact.
1
 
However, even though the legend remains historically unverifiable, it is nevertheless 
important to recount since it has given rise to a philosophically rich effective history. 
Daoist philosophy is said to rest on an act of exchange. The sage Lao Zi was 
determined to leave the middle kingdom after a long and, despite dissatisfaction with 
the norms of his day, saturated life. He approached the Western border of the 
kingdom of Zhou where he encountered Yin Xi, who was the ancient version of a 
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customs and border control officer. Yin Xi asked Lao Zi to pay his dues. Since the 
sage was not an affluent man and did not possess anything dispensable, he was 
politely asked to pay for his passage by writing down what he had discovered during 
his philosophical wayfaring. After giving in to the request, Lao Zi left the kingdom to 
move West where he died much later at the magnificent age of 160. According to this 
legend, it is thus only by accident, or, to be more precise, through a generous act of 
exchanging the right of passage for the codification of Daoist philosophy, that the 
5000 words divided into the 81 chapters we know under the title of Dao-De-Jing have 
been passed down to us. 
  During his exile from Nazi Germany, the Marxist poet Bertholt Brecht carried a 
painting depicting the scene of Lao Zi riding a water buffalo towards the border with 
him. Brecht's captivating poem from 1938 about the ―Legend of the Origin of the 
Book Dao-De-Jing on Lao Zi's Road into Exile‖ was circulated widely among those 
persecuted by totalitarian regimes. The poem sparked a sense of hope in the midst of 
historical catastrophe. Did Brecht's adaptation of the legend simply present an 
unwarranted and sufficiently exotic consolation for the victims of an atrocious history 
who, if they were lucky, could escape, or does it indeed contain a philosophically 
significant content, an explosive message in a bottle? When the boy accompanying 
Lao Zi was asked by the pragmatic gate keeper in Brecht's poem what the sage had 
discovered, the boy responds: ―he learnt that soft water, by way of movement over the 
years, will grind strong rocks away. In other words: that hardness succumbs.‖2 
Drawing on the at the time common trope of the power of water to overcome the 
seemingly greatest of obstacles,
3
 what Brecht's border-crosser Lao Zi had discovered 
was an understanding of what could be called ―liquid resistance.‖ In contrast to firm 
materials, formless water does not overcome obstacles by way of direct confrontation, 
but through seemingly unintended, effortless and unpredictable processes of 
emulation and changing course whenever necessary. Rather than provoking resistance 
through acts of direct engagement, water is efficacious in overcoming obstacles by 
way of yielding and acquiescing to them. It purifies itself by standing still and finds 
its way by floating to the lowest point. The captivating poem by Brecht and its 
equally rich effective history poses the vexing question: what is the critical potential 
of Daoist philosophy that motivated Brecht and other social critics identifying with 
the fate of the most abject, degraded and precarious forms of existence to be swayed 
                                                 
2
 Bertolt Brecht (1981, 660-663). The cited quotation from stanza 5 reads in the original: „Daß das 
weiche Wasser in Bewegung/ Mit der Zeit den mächtigen Stein besiegt. / Du verstehst, das Harte 
unterliegt.― See also Heinrich Detering (2008). 
3
 The water imagery is developed in chapters 4, 7, 43 and, most extensively, in chapter 78 of the Dao-
De-Jing: ―In all the world, nothing is more supple or weak than water/ Yet nothing can surpass it for 
attacking what is still and strong./ And so nothing can take its place./ That the weak overcomes the 
strong and the supple overcomes the hard/ These are things everyone in the world knows but none can 
practice.‖ (chapter 78, 81). Sarah Allan (1997) persuasively traces the way in which water serves as a 
root metaphor to illustrate the principles governing human conduct in classical, pre-Qin Chinese 
philosophical traditions.  
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by its message, a message that seems radically different from the typical Marxist call 
to arms in the service of historical struggle for the sake of the worst-off?  
  Brecht's adaptation of Daoism seems all the more perplexing given the conception 
of Chinese philosophy in the West. One common critique leveled against Chinese 
philosophical traditions goes something like this. Rather than providing another 
alternative foundation for Enlightenment reason, Confucianism and Daoism are 
essentially incompatible with individual autonomy and equality, the pillars of the 
Enlightenment project. The alleged deficit is then attributed to a difference in 
philosophical outlook. The age of critique, announced in a tone of philosophical 
audacity from the Neo-Copernican Kant, claims philosophical singularity and 
superiority with regard to his East Asian contenders. While Western philosophical 
traditions in the Enlightenment tradition call into question established webs of 
authority, the emphasis on cosmic harmony in Confucianism and Daoism is said to 
rest on an acceptance of unquestioned relationships of power. In other words, 
harmony is emphasized at the expense of a capacity for individual resistance and 
critique. If autonomy and equality are the pillars of enlightenment reason, the 
capacity to resist is its muscle. If Daoism just gives in to established authorities, it 
does not possess the capacity of resistance, thus making it unsuitable for 
emancipation emphasized in the wake of the Enlightenment.  
  Following this line of critique, two specific strains of objections against Daoism's 
emancipatory potential and enlightenment deficit thus need to be addressed up front 
before discussing in what sense Daoism can be interpreted as a critical theory. One 
line of critique is addressed at Daoism's primitivist naturalism while the other set of 
objections focuses on the proposed technique of emulation. The first group of critics 
conceives of Daoism as a reactionary movement propagating a return to nature. Such 
movements claim that the present is fallen when compared to an allegedly earlier, 
blissful state in need of being restored once again. The emulation of a constantly 
changing yet static environment envisioned by Daoists is criticized as a form of 
imitation of, or a call for a return to, a primary state of nature. The natural world is 
being romanticized, critics contend, as idyllic and ethically superior. This line of 
critique, clearly mirroring Christian conceptions of a myth of the primal fall as one 
finds them in Western romanticism, hardly does justice to the gist of the normative 
ideals we find in the oldest Daoist texts. Rather than advocating a return to a 
simplicity that allegedly existed in some prior historical period, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi 
draw on what they describe as "natural" processes in order to delineate structures of 
present flourishing in the midst of "historical" crises. Nature is not what happened 
prior to the fall from paradise to civilization, but the spontaneity which is ever again 
threatened to be covered up by webs of social domination and misguided authority.  
  That the pervasive reference to nature in Daoist texts is not the kind of naturalism 
the first group of critics take it to be becomes clear if we turn to the first readers of 
the classical Daoists who stressed that emulation is not to be misunderstood as 
imitation. Guo Xiang already emphasized in his commentary on the Zhuang-Zi (莊子) 
that blind imitation of an allegedly natural condition is useless, fruitless and harmful. 
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Imitation is useless because the world is in constant flux and different times require 
different responses. Imitation is also fruitless since the very act of imitation 
presupposes a conscious effort, which stands in the way of achieving the naturalness 
that is being attributed to what is being imitated. And, finally, imitation is said to be 
harmful in that it manifests a constant striving to overcome one's limits. This 
overcoming rather than acknowledging stands in the way of optimal, we could also 
say, non-reified practices of self- other- and world-relationships.
4
 The term ‗zi-ran‘ 
(自然), which is translated as ‗natural‘, offers itself as a denominator for such 
processes of spontaneous flourishing. Just as optimal forms of action seem to be 
performed as if by themselves and without an ulterior end, nature also is not equipped 
with a fixed trajectory while revealing a sense of flourishing and fittingness. The 
reference to naturalness serves as a critique against artificial forms of ―second nature‖ 
in the form of reified conceptions of morality and straining activism.  
  In the case of an occasional reference to an allegedly better past, for example to 
the utopian village in chapter 80 of the Dao-De-Jing, what is depicted is not a 
historical past of perfected human beings who live in harmony with nature. Rather, 
the images serve as mythic or utopian evocations of a mode of being and power-
execution which is significantly different and more sophisticated than that found in 
societies which use up all resources in acts of instrumental activism.
5
 In the case of 
the utopian village, what is depicted is not a primitive community before the fall. The 
city possesses tools such as ships and carts, armor and weapons, but they ―have no 
reason to deploy them.‖6 This city consists a group of people, which is 
technologically highly advanced while preserving the freedom to not use the 
technology at its disposal, to live a decelerated life in the present while leaving the 
technological choices at their disposal unused whenever their application is not 
absolutely necessary. They live in relatively small communities in order not to be 
governed by a distant government they do not have an obvious connection to. The 
imagination is used here as a laboratory to provide impulses in order to enrich 
conceptions of chosen, communal and sophisticated passivity in the present rather 
than primitive innocence or unreflective activism directed at the future.  
  Apart from the charge of primitive naturalism, a second, perhaps more forceful 
strain of objections against Daoism's critical potential concerns what is seen as the 
opportunistic strategy or set of techniques arising out of the ethics of emulation. 
While the first group of critics object to Daoism's alleged primitivism, the second 
group object to the proposed forms of emulation. This second strain of objections 
contends that Daoism essentially reconciles actors to the pathological structures of 
their age rather than empowering them to understand, oppose and, ultimately, 
transform or abolish these structures. This critique reflects a long tradition of 
                                                 
4
 Fung Yu-Lan (1976, 226-227). 
5
 Viktor Kalinke (1999, 90) writes, ―it is apparent that the emphasis of what has been does not aim at 
an objective historiography, but at the decelleration (Verzögerung) of action. A reflection and 
comparison with what is comparable is being called for. It has a psychological function, which is 
expressed in the German word 'nachdenken' (re-membering or after-thought)‖.  
6
 Dao-De-Jing, trans. Ivanhoe (chapter 81). 
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accusing Daoism of promoting a problematic form of quietism. Rather than resisting 
problematic processes of change, they are said to accept these phenomena as 
unchangeable. The best one can do, Daoists seem to suggest, is to use what is 
problematic but here to stay to one's advantage. The enfent terrible of contemporary 
philosophy Slavoi Zizek puts it as follows:  
 
The recourse to Taoism or Buddhism offers a way out of this predicament which 
definitely work better than the desperate escape into old traditions: instead of trying to 
cope with the accelerating rhythm of the technological progress and social changes, one 
should rather renounce the very endeavor to retain control over what goes on, rejecting it 
as the expression of the modern logic of domination - one should, instead, ―let oneself 
go,‖ drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance 
of the accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and 
technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances 
which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being... One is almost tempted to 
resuscitate here the old infamous Marxist cliché of religion as the ―opium of the people,‖ 
as the imaginary supplement of the terrestrial misery: the ―Western Buddhist‖ meditative 
stance is arguably the most efficient way, for us, to fully participate in the capitalist 
dynamics, while retaining the appearance of mental sanity. If Max Weber were to live 
today, he would definitely write a second, supplementary, volume to his Protestant Ethic, 
entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of the Global Capitalism.
7
 
 
While Zizek agrees that Daoism is not a form of primitivist romanticism, he argues 
that contemporary appropriations of Eastern thought, in particular Daoism, are a 
psychic symptom of neoliberal capitalism rather than promising conceptual and 
practical tools to understand and transform it. Rather than coming to terms with the 
accelerating logic of late modern societies, Daoist patterns of action, on Zizek's 
account, at best help to wander at ease within these pathological structures. They keep 
up the illusion of equanimous mental sanity in the midst of catastrophic madness.  
  Just as the charge against Daoism‘s alleged primitivism, Zizek's interpretation 
seems mistaken to me. It might be a legitimate response to certain ―Eurodaoist‖8 
forms of lifestyle philosophies and new age wisdom literature propagating that a 
spiritual change will automatically lead to a transformation of the environing system 
parameters. What the objection fails to acknowledge and do justice to, though, is the 
emancipatory impulse behind Daoism. Rather than opposing one's changing 
environment with outdated images of bliss, by emulating this environment in 
constantly readjusting ways like a river adjusts its course, actors reclaim naturalness 
in their action and become empowered. Such an empowerment does not proceed by 
mastering the world through one's purposive efforts, but emancipates itself by 
                                                 
7
 Slavoi Zizek (2001). Zizek missed the fact that Max Weber (1989) did indeed write a second less 
known sequel to the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in which he explicitly addresses 
Confucianism and the heterodox dimensions of Daoism while arguing for their responsibility for the 
precarious condition of China around the turn to the 20
th
 century.  
8
 Peter Sloterdijk (1989). 
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responding to the environment in the form of adjusting to dynamic processes in 
refined and often subversive ways.   
  Perhaps the most prominent and promising critical concept of Daoism is the 
guiding conceptual metaphor of wu-wei (無爲). It captures what this liquid resistance 
means in terms of concrete actions. Wu-wei is commonly translated as ―non-doing‖ or 
―non-action‖. Following Liu Xiaogan, we can say that ―naturalness is the core value 
of the thought of Lao Zi, while wu-wei is the principle or method for realizing this 
value in action.‖9 This essential action-theoretical concept fills an important lacuna in 
contemporary critical theory. A charitable reconstruction could be immensely 
productive in contemporary debates in critical theory and the philosophy of action 
developed in the contemporary analytic and continental traditions.
10
 Such a 
reconstruction would free philosophical Daoism from its alleged enlightenment 
deficit.  
  Even a cursory look at the writings of the classical Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi 
suffices to reveal their emancipatory potential. Due to their hermeneutic openness, 
Daoist sources have been interpreted at different times as primitivism, religious 
mysticism, military strategy, advice to emperors, manuals for religious initiation and 
self-cultivation, normative and epistemic relativism, precursors of postmodernism, 
anarchism, linguistic skepticism or simply as a collection of incoherent poetic sayings 
which defy the systematizing and rigorous logic common to mainstream 
contemporary philosophy.
11
 In what follows I would like to add one more reading and 
suggest that the spirit of Daoism is captured best when it is understood as a form of 
critical theory. Daoists propose a different enlightenment and a different critical 
theory, thereby presenting us with what Bert Brecht called a device of bringing forth 
a defamiliarization and estrangement (Verfremdungseffekt). This interpretative 
hypothesis can serve as a prolegomena to a future research project. To make such a 
project not only plausible but also fruitful, I would like to show that Daoism, 
understood as a distinctly other form of critical theory, is capable of providing 
impulses that could be taken up in addressing one of the most pressing issues facing 
critical theorists today.  
   Daoism, I argue, can be helpful in conceiving of a form of non-instrumental 
action and reawaken a sense of potentiality, which helps to uncover a blind spot at the 
basis of conceptions of time and action as we find it in contemporary critical 
philosophy. A charitable reinterpretation of the Daoist concept of wu-wei allows us to 
                                                 
9
 Xiaogan Liu (1999, 211).  
10
 Edward Slingerland (2006) interprets the conception of wu-wei understood as effortless action. It 
might be argued that certain theories of action in the European canon point into similar directions. 
Aristotle's conception of praxis, for example, and its reception by Hannah Arendt and others come to 
mind. I will show at a different occasion that these conceptions retain the temporal framework 
governing purposive actions, motivating a more radical break such as the one provided by an updated 
account of Daoist effortless action.  
11
 For a detailed account of the history of Daoism see Livia Kohn (2000), as well as Russell Kirkland 
(2004). For a systematic introduction see Hans-Georg Möller (2001). 
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conceive of a form of practical reason and action, which embodies a promising 
alternative to instrumental rationality. A reorientation of critique resulting from a 
constructive engagement with Daoism would have to arise out of an acknowledgment 
that one of the underlying ideologies of modernity consists precisely in a problematic 
preoccupation with either the past or the future at the expense of acknowledging 
perfecting forms of effortless action as they reveal themselves in the present. To make 
this claim intelligible it is necessary to call to mind the basic structure of critical 
theory.  
 
2. THE THREEFOLD STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY 
 
First, it is necessary to outline what is meant by ―critical theory‖ before pursuing the 
question whether, and in what sense, Daoism can legitimately be understood as 
another critical theory. Critical theory usually combines diagnostic, explanatory and 
emancipatory dimensions. In analyzing societies in times of crises and destitution, 
deeply seated pathologies are uncovered. These range from exploitation of 
underprivileged strata of the population and consumerism to the environmental and 
social costs of neoliberal market economies. Not only are these pathologies revealed, 
but their root causes and social functions are also being traced and, if possible, means 
of practically overcoming them are pointed out.  
  Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level 
manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, 
motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing 
can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of 
reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly 
understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the 
perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed 
increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, 
individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the 
process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human 
beings.
12
 
   The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle 
governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early 
Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.
13
 Originally reification referred to 
the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and 
exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed 
outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from 
which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a 
critique of the reification/distortion of communication,
14
 the reification of 
relationships of intersubjective recognition,
15
 the reification of gender roles
16
 or the 
                                                 
12
 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 
13
 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 
14
 Jürgen Habermas (1984).   
15
 Axel Honneth (1996).  
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reification of conceptions of the self,
17
 what is being criticized are relationships 
primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining 
processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and 
other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice.  
  Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology 
in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory 
to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective 
pathologies of communication and reification.
18
 People in late modern societies do 
not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than 
recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ 
(Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of 
meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and 
customs have lost their power in orienting lives.  
  Finally, the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning 
have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration (Beschleunigung) in which, 
as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a 
progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social 
change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of 
change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during 
classical and high modernity, late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational 
speed of change in which the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change 
within a lifetime. In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is 
that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.
19
 This 
acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of 
accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and 
people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased 
change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity 
formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of 
life, practices and sets of convictions. 
   All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological 
impact of reification leads to systematic forms of forced inclusion or exclusion, of 
being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities, and the process of 
disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of 
binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are 
experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is 
an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, 
or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies.    
  However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there 
is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of 
modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration 
                                                                                                                                           
16
 Judith Butler (1999).  
17
 Michel Foucault (1977). 
18
 See J.M. Bernstein (2001); Nikolas Kompridis (2006). 
19
 Hartmut Rosa, (2005, chapter 5). 
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historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification 
consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a 
toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In 
this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor 
taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently 
realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation 
of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, 
stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would 
become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing 
the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for 
living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as 
long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly 
rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly 
alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, 
but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from 
the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the 
present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are 
regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of 
what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is 
not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective 
action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is 
transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point 
of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we 
can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will 
become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of 
what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action 
as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to 
realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in 
which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is 
directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. 
It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This 
rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends 
pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves 
deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity.  
  The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously 
described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as 
insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises 
oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and 
speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly 
                                                 
20
 Bernard Williams (1982, 13). Harry Frankfurt objects to Williams on this point by arguing that ―our 
interest in living does not commonly depend upon our having projects that we desire to pursue. It's the 
other way around: we are interested in having worthwhile projects because we do intend to go on 
living, and we would prefer not to be bored.‖ Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right (2006, 36-
37).   
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shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle 
never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of 
chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation 
adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true 
innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement 
and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly 
impossible.
21
 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. 
Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the 
present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The 
consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a 
continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the 
tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced 
innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.
22
 
  The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that 
whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual 
understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, 
instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the 
future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors 
propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the 
same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the 
belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The 
problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out 
differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the 
significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. 
In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being 
"for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a pre-
future, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in.    
  A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the 
inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. 
Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides 
with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of 
instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long 
history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake 
of histories of catastrophes.
23
 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger 
than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present 
potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the 
possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal 
logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the 
present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and 
sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - 
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corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - 
leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the 
present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of 
the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an 
extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists 
only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to 
justify themselves with respect to the past.  
  This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a 
dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out 
of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A 
transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could 
turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which 
instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, 
however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as 
another critical theory. 
 
3. DAOISM AS ANOTHER CRITICAL THEORY 
 
In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a 
critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the 
uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on 
the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, 
commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an 
alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action 
expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At 
the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different 
tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich 
conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical 
preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long 
history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as 
practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical 
theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the 
fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the 
developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives 
to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and 
uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, 
disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental 
action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose 
pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically 
address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet 
another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of 
the future.  
  Before focusing on how Daoism could help to address the connection between 
suffering from reification, disenchantment and acceleration, let us first step back and 
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consider the all but self-evident proposal to conceive of Daoism as a form of critical 
theory. I will only briefly mention the diagnostic and explanatory dimensions for the 
reasons that they are the weakest and least developed parts in Daoist thinking, while 
the emancipatory dimension offers a way to address the question concerning the 
difficulty arising from the attempt to overcome instrumental rationality without 
replicating its underlying temporal logic.  
  First, Daoism is critical in the most obvious and widely acknowledged sense in 
that it presents a response to the destitution of China during the late Zhou dynasty in 
which war and social disintegration threatened the stability of society.
24
 Apart from 
this historical reason, exposing certain parallels with today's crises-ridden global 
order, both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi are critical of the philosophical attempts to address 
this destitution, especially the attempt of Confucius and his successor, Mencius. 
Whereas Confucius and his followers propagated the cultivation of the virtuous 
human being with the goal of integrating him or her into a hierarchically ordered 
social organism through the subjection to principles of love and filial piety, the 
Daoists pursued a conscious retreat from commonly accepted social norms and 
rejected the starting point of normative theory understood as outlining universal, 
context-independent principles of social obligation and cultivation more generally: 
―Filial piety, brotherliness, benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, trust, honor, 
integrity-for all of these you must drive yourself and make a slave of Virtue.‖25 While 
the Confucians aim at cultivating the individual to fulfill the duties springing from his 
or her fixed position in the web of social relationships, the Daoists propagate an 
unlearning process with the indirect goal of interrupting webs of social integration, 
including the desire for social recognition, for the sake of cultivating spontaneity. The 
individual is strengthened in his or her capacity to resist with regard to commonly 
accepted values of the community. However, the liquid, readjusting self propagated 
by Daoism is not an autonomous, deliberative firm subject commonly known in the 
Western philosophical traditions. Rather, it is a flexible or liquid self, which refuses 
to adhere to context-independent moral principles while responding to its 
environment in emancipatory ways.
26
 
  By focusing on outlining context-independent moral obligations, Confucian 
benevolence only addresses the pathologies of the age at the surface level, while 
leaving the deeper causes of alienation from the dao, the patterns of spontaneous 
flourishing, untouched: ―When the great Way is abandoned, there are benevolence 
and righteousness. When wisdom and intelligence come forth, there is great 
hypocrisy. When the six familial relationships are out of balance, there are kind 
parents and filial children. When the state is in turmoil and chaos, there are loyal 
ministers.‖27 As a form of proto-ideology critique, Daoism thus reveals how moral 
systems of belief serve as justifications of the underlying pathological practices rather 
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than adequately addressing and, wherever possible, transforming them. The point 
made by Daoists is that it is not helpful to change the moral convictions of the time as 
long as one does not also change the underlying practices.  
  In the earlier analysis of the logic of instrumental action we have seen that by way 
of trying to master the present for the sake of a future project, the openness of the 
present is closed and the present shrinks. Constant innovation becomes a means in 
order to desperately try to gather more experiences and rush after fugitive goals in 
every shorter time spans. Critical theory has been incapable of addressing the 
pathology of acceleration in theoretically plausible and practically promising ways by 
failing to see through the temporal structure underlying instrumental, purposive 
action. This becomes particularly obvious when we turn to the third dimension of a 
critical social theory, that of opening up or at least pointing to transformative 
dimensions. In order to distance itself from the norms prevalent in the society, critical 
theory in a Daoist spirit has to point to something that is not only significantly 
different, but also significantly better. Only when it is possible to disclose 
possibilities that promise to overcome or at least significantly ameliorate the 
diagnosed pathologies as forms of social injury are we dealing with a progressive 
rather than reactionary force. The emancipatory dimension distinguishes mere 
cultural critique from critical theory.  
  In what way, then, does a reconstruction of Daoist conception of the relationship 
between optimal action and time point towards a transformative potential in the 
present? A charitable reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei would, without doubt, 
have to abandon certain metaphysical background assumptions common to ancient 
Daoism. In particular it is necessary to dismiss the cosmological conception of a basic 
harmony of the cosmos as well as the possibility of retreating from societies, 
including the norms governing these societies. It is not plausible to assume that the 
moderns have simply lost the right path or dao, because this would presuppose that 
there once was or always is a right path one could be led astray from. Rather, we 
might say metaphorically that the dao itself has become astray to express that social 
structures take on pathological forms. In other words, many of the pathologies of late 
modern societies are not directly to be attributed to the decisions of individual actors 
but are structural dimensions governing all spheres of society as much as theses 
spheres are only reproduced through human action. Actors cannot simply leave 
behind an unhealthy for a healthy dao, but have to uncover dimensions within dao, 
dimensions pointing to forms of actions, which allow for flourishing and 
transformation from within. Given these ramifications, a charitable interpretation of 
wu-wei could provide valuable insights for contemporary action theory in the context 
of critical social theory. I have suggested that wu-wei, understood as pertaining to the 
form of an action performed in an effortless way, provides a radically different 
conception of optimal action from that of purposive, instrumental activity.  
  As a key normative concept, wu-wei could perhaps be better translated as, 
following Ames and Hall, ―non-coercive action‖ or, following Eric Sean Nelson, as 
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―effortless non-calculative responsiveness‖28 to avoid the passive and quietist 
implications associated with the literal translation ―non-action‖ or ―non-doing‖.29 
Since the term appears in many different contexts and different texts, it can at best 
serve as an umbrella concept covering a potentially unlimited set of practices, which 
have some things in common and diverge in other dimensions. It is fair to say that 
due to its high valuation in classical Chinese texts, activities or forms of 
responsiveness referred to as displaying the structure of wu-wei present an 
achievement. They are optimal forms of comportment. While they can be cultivated, 
they don't follow the same means-end rationality which reduces the means to be only 
instrumentally useful and has a tendency to wear subjects out in accelerating 
processes of a forgetfulness of the present.  
  It has been argued by Chris Fraser, among others, that it is misleading to conceive 
of wu-wei as a form of effortless action and that it would be better to interpret it as 
non-intentional action instead.
30
 To understand why it is nevertheless justified to 
understand wu-wei as involving effortless dimensions rather than focusing on non-
intentionality it is essential to distinguish two different senses of effort. This will 
allow us to avoid the misunderstanding that wu-wei would be an irrational, non-
purposive state of simply letting oneself go without conscious focus. Wu-wei 
interrupts a certain form of effortful striving. When referring to effort, we often 
conflate objective effort with subjectively experienced effort. While the former 
includes the exercise of physiological processes (physical effort) as well as thought 
processes (mental effort), the latter refers to the subjective feeling of exertion and 
exhaustion.
31
 When translating wu-wei as a form of ―effortless non-calculative 
responsiveness‖ (rather than nonintentional action), what is meant is not the absence 
of objective effort, but a decreasing amount of subjectively experienced 
strenuousness. Such forms of performing an action without exhausting oneself 
coincide with the deliberate and often skilled performance of a practice. Often 
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 Ames and Hall (2003, 44-45); Eric Sean Nelson (2009, 294-316 and 396).  
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 For the purpose of this paper I will ignore the use of wu-wei as literally doing nothing and relegating 
tasks to subordinates in the context of good governance depicted in the figure of the emperor who, by 
relegating all authorities and responsibilities to his inferiors, constitutes the invisible and inactive 
center of power. See Roger Ames (1994).   
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 Chris Fraser proposes to adopt a diachronic model of action in which ―acquisition begins with 
deliberate exertion, but eventually we internalize the skill and develop the ability to act automatically 
and sometimes effortlessly‖ (2007, 101). Such a quasi-Aristotelian two-phase model of action (first 
effortful acquisition and habituation, then effortless exertion of a skill) might fit some of the examples 
in Zhuang-Zi, including that of butcher Ding. It is not in line with wu-wei as the instantaneous 
transformation of the nature of one's character and action as it is introduced in the respective passages 
from Dao-De-Jing. In our context, the two-phase model would be incapable of explaining the 
transition from a perfectionist, future-oriented form of cultivation to an effortless and skillful 
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acts of cultivation, but it constitutes a transfiguration of the very form of the action an actor is involved 
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following of rules. 
31
 The distinction is introduced by Brian Bruya in the introduction to the rich collection of 
interdisciplinary essays on effortless attention (2010, 5).  
64 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011)  WENNING 
effortless actions tend to coincide precisely with an increased form of identification 
with highly complex forms of skilled action ranging from playing chess and juggling 
to speaking a natural language fluently. These actions are intentional in the sense that 
when being asked why an actor engages in them, he could provide a reason for his 
action as an answer.
32
 However, when wu-wei-like actions are conducted well, the 
consciousness of these reasons and especially the conscious fixation on future goals, 
which needs to be actualized through significant degrees of subjectively felt 
exhaustion, drops out of the field of experience of the actor.  
  One classic example to illustrate the structure of wu-wei-like actions is the story 
of cook Ding mentioned in Zhuang-Zi. The cook perfected the skill of cutting up oxen 
by learning how to use a knife with the greatest subtlety, avoiding any unnecessary 
friction. Ding did so by "using his cultivated intuition rather than his eyes" to cut up 
the ox according to his joints, avoiding all unnecessary resistance and thereby 
transforming an instrumental skill into an effective and context-sensitive art, an ars 
contextualis.
33
 He perfected the art of butchery to the point of not having to blindly 
follow rules in a subjectively as well as objectively (with regard to the sharpness of 
the blade of the knife) exhausting way. This does not mean that cutting up the ox does 
not confront the butcher with challenges. Otherwise he would not even need a knife 
and would not be a master of his art. It also does not mean that Ding could not 
provide reasons for what he is doing. After all, he explains his philosophy of intuitive 
mastery to Lord Wen-Hui. However, when challenges arise, Ding stops for a moment 
to ―size up the difficulties‖ and focuses on the activity in the present in a slow and 
calm manner rather than wasting his energies in forms of overly strenuous and hasty 
acts of applying a context-independent method. The story does not simply illustrate 
the benefits of wu-wei-like action, but offers a normative model, which "goes beyond 
skill" and, in Lord Wen-Hui‘s words, illustrates ―the secret of caring for life‖.34 This 
secret, we may infer, is that the mastery of practices does not rest on analyzing or 
reasoning from principles, but in spontaneously attending to a situation intuitively and 
with a high degree of effortless concentration and dedication.   
  What is significant for our context is the specific temporality of engaging in wu-
wei. What the concept wu-wei designates is a perfection in the moment of present 
action rather than a perfection the goal of which is being projected into the future. 
The vital organ of decision making processes is the heart-mind xin (心) rather than 
the disembodied intellect. ―For the ancient Chinese,‖ A.C. Graham remarks, ―the 
heart, not the brain, is the organ of thought. Most men use it to plan ahead, but the 
sage uses it only to reflect the situation as it objectively is, before he responds. Like a 
mirror, it reflects only the present; it is not stuffed with past information which it 
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‗retains‘ (ts'ang [cang 藏] ‗stores, hoards‘) at the cost of being trapped in obsolete 
attitudes. The sage perceives and responds to every situation as new.‖35 
  Seen from a temporal perspective, wu-wei is intended to free the future-creating 
presence as it discloses itself from the perspective of an actor who is pursuing his task 
in a skillful and whole-hearted fashion in the ever new and newly experienced 
present. The actor is fully absorbed into performing an action well to the point of 
forgetting himself, the passage of time, as well as extrinsic goals of the action. It is 
easy to see that an action carried out in this way is also self-rewarding while being 
indirectly efficacious. The actor forgets the passage of time and is not being inhibited 
by the anxiety connected to goal fixation while he might nevertheless indirectly 
realize goals which are important to him. Being in a state of fully absorbed, 
meaningful and skilled action includes a heightened responsiveness to the constantly 
changing potential of the context surrounding the action. Rather than acting only 
locally by detaching a certain task, instrument or goal from its context, the actor 
mirrors the situation in its entirety. By freeing the attention for the demands of the 
present moment from the weight of a recollected past and the demands of a not yet 
present future, it allows an action to be spontaneous rather than being guided by a 
fixed plan the goal of which is projected beyond the here and now. The actor is not 
wearing himself out in the process of being plagued by a deadline attached to his 
project, but exercises his energies efficiently in the mastery of the art of perfecting 
action.   
  Based on the concept of wu-wei, a critique of the temporal logic underlying 
instrumental action that is lacking in critical theory becomes possible. In contrast to 
the inactivity of an apathetic person, the actor practicing wu-wei engages the present 
in non-instrumental ways. Rather than limiting non-instrumental action to the 
aesthetic realm as has been common in the European tradition from Schiller until 
Adorno or that of intersubjectivity as in the tradition from Kant to Habermas and 
Honneth, the domains in which actions can be practiced in a wu-wei-like manner is 
virtually unlimited.  
  Drawing on insights arising from analytic philosophy of mind and action, Chris 
Fraser has shown that wu-wei can be understood as what John Searle refers to as ―the 
Background‖.36 The Background is a term of art referring to the various tacit 
capacities, abilities and know-how an actor always already draws on whenever 
performing an action. These unthematized background conditions allow for an action 
to be successful while facing real time challenges that could not be solved through 
slow acts of premeditation. Classic examples would be the intuitive operation of a 
car's transmission or speaking a language fluently. These actions are being performed 
without having to calculate which gear is appropriate for which speed or consciously 
having to apply the rules of grammar.  
  Fraser ultimately criticizes wu-wei-based normative accounts of action since they 
proclaim to do away with the kind of higher-level deliberation that he rightly 
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considers fundamental to engaging in moral reasoning and other practices. I agree 
with Fraser that it is necessary to account for these forms of intentional deliberation 
while I disagree with him in excluding higher order intentional deliberation from the 
realm of potentially wu-wei forms of activities. What Fraser's reductivist analysis of 
wu-wei understood as nonintentional action fails to see is that reasoning is an action 
as well, a thought-action.
37
 Thought actions also always presuppose a background of 
tacit assumptions, including normative assumptions, meanings and associations of 
concepts, etc. A contemporary reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei understood as 
effortless non-calculative responsiveness (rather than nonintentional action) can thus 
also be applied to cognitive thought-acts. In the mentioned story of butcher Ding as 
well as other stories, Zhuang Zi emphasizes that the person who knows what he is 
doing often engages in thinking before he makes his moves. However, such thinking 
does not decide between alternative courses of action by applying rules in judgment 
(bian 辩). Rather, as A.C. Graham points out, such a form of attentive thinking is  an 
intuitive sorting out (lun 論).38 Accordingly, artificial forms of deliberation, which are 
nonspontaneous, strenuous and fixated on following predetermined principles and 
future goals, are then to be distinguished from those kinds of genuine thought-actions 
which are conducted in a skillful, responsive and spontaneous manner with a 
heightened attention for and awareness of the specific needs of the evolving present. 
Daoism would espouse the latter while dismissing the former practices. Free 
intentional deliberation consists in an open encounter with intentional contents. 
Searle's assertion that ―intentionality reaches down to the bottom level of the 
voluntary actions‖39 thus needs to be extended by adding that spontaneity and 
effortlessness receptivity also reaches all the way up to the level of intentionality.
40
 
Only by acknowledging that wu-wei potentially applies to all actions, including 
thought-acts, do we get an insight into the scope and impact of Daoist naturalism. 
Once we acknowledge that many of our thought contents, as Galan Strawson's puts it, 
―just happen‖,41 the question becomes whether we can make any general claims about 
how to relate to them responsively. Actors are not simply confronted with neutral, 
occurring episodes entering and leaving their field of attention, but stand to their 
streams of consciousness in a relationship that Harry Frankfurt aptly characterizes as 
one of caring.
42
 In the process of wu-wei-like action, the actor does not distinguish 
between an instrumental value of intermediary goals and an absolute value of the 
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future, final goal. Rather, as Graham shows, the only imperative of the Daoist critic of 
imperatives is ―respond with awareness of what is objectively so.‖43 If an action is 
performed in a wu-wei-like manner, the actor does not only, and not even primarily 
care for the realization of the goals of his action, but also cares about how well, in the 
sense of how attentive, the action leading to such a realization is being performed. 
Daoists agree that if an action is carried out well, the actor responds to streams of 
inherently interconnected mental and physical events in a focused and context-
sensitive manner. He is in a state of acquiescence to the specificity of the task 
performed and the context in which it is performed. In other words, he stops to see 
these events as unacceptable intruders that need to be sorted out anxiously according 
to given rules and reified plans, but as providing occasions or invitations for actions, 
actions which are responsive, sensitive and focused.  
  The implications of conceiving of optimal intentional action as not being one of 
an overtaxing, future-directed effort, but one that effortlessly focuses on the demands 
of the present, are far reaching. An action, which is not based on the logic of striving 
for future goals but on performing a practice well in the here and now, is the most 
efficacious form of practice since it does not waste its energy in fruitless 
confrontation. This is not to say that wu-wei-like actions could not be executed 
quickly. Wu-wei concerns the form rather than the speed in which an action is carried 
out. Whether an action is being performed quickly or slowly does not determine 
whether it is performed in an absorbed and responsive way. Sitting still, for example 
in the context of meditation, can be non-wu-wei-like in involving a lot of effort when 
the person meditating forces himself to sit still for ulterior goals. The skilled mastery 
of the juggler over his cascades or the engagement in a lively conversation, on the 
other hand, might be performed quasi-automatically even if involving quick and 
spontaneous responses. Conscious deceleration, be it through eating in a slower pace 
or turning to meditation, might further perpetuate the temporal logic of the 
instrumental calculus as long as it is performed with too much effort and connected to 
a focus on an extrinsic concern. The efficacy of effortless action is not one measured 
by calculating future gains against present costs, but one that takes into account how 
far the acting individual is in fact in tune with the rhythm of his or her environment 
by responding to challenges of that environment as they arise in ever readjusting 
forms. Such a process of being ―in tune‖ combines mastery and responsiveness, 
engagement and receptivity, order and spontaneity, purpose and disinterestedness. 
Effortless action is thus not subject to following a universal set of norms as the 
Confucians (or Kantians) would have it. Rather, a person performing actions well 
generates singular norms that arise from, and do justice to, the concrete situation 
(auto-nomous).  
  The state of mind that a person is in while exercising noncalculative and 
responsive action has been compared to what psychologists have described as ―flow 
experience‖. Flowing action provides an antidote to the accelerating, reifying and 
disenchanting logic that drives instrumental action. It comes as no surprise that 
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Zhuang Zi‘s story concerning cook Ding's perfected carving of an ox serves as a 
prominent example in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's classic Flow: The Psychology of 
Optimal Experience in which ‗yu‘ (御) is being translated as ‗flow‘.44 Flow comes 
about when human actors are absorbed in the present tasks at hand. The present tasks 
at hand are seen as providing living potentials rather than dead means for ulterior 
ends. When actors in flow states are confronted by a challenging task, the completion 
of this task lets the actor forget the past and the future. Interrupting ordinary 
strenuous comportment, an actor undergoing flow experiences also overcomes a 
reified sense of self, thereby ―dereifying‖ or liquifying, reenchanting, and 
decelerating his relationship to the objects he produces, himself, the act of production 
and his fellow human beings. Flow arises out of a balancing act that is in constant 
danger of collapsing either into becoming a rote routine or an overtaxing effort. The 
overtaxing effort brings forth unnecessary forms of reactions, while the rote routine 
lacks the sense of freedom and potential. The art of wu-wei thus consists in 
successfully striking and sustaining a balance between extreme effort and passive 
rule-following. If an actor is capable of sustaining such a balance, there is a harmony 
between his desires and will. In this sense wu-wei-kind of actions are free actions as 
they are characterized by Frankfurt: ―a free act is one that a person performs simply 
because he wants to perform it. Enjoying freedom of action consists in maintaining 
this harmonious accord between what we do and what we want to do.‖45 As different 
as the underlying temporality is, the guiding ideal of effortless, attentive actions 
provides a surprising overlap with the guiding Western ideal of positive freedom.  
  Let me end by returning to the legend concerning the origin of the Dao-De-Jing. 
According to this legend, the book was written down by Lao Zi through his student as 
a form of road toll in order to pass the toll-keeper at the Han pass when moving West. 
It is an irony of history that perhaps the first critique of the principle of exchanging 
the present for the future was passed down to us based on an operation of exchanging 
the written word for the right of passage. Lao Zi, the first critic of the assumption that 
we could once and for all fix the living knowledge necessary to traverse the changing 
way with timeless principles,
46
 paid for his final passage by writing down and thus 
codifying the idea according to which water defeats the stone. Walter Benjamin, 
perhaps the most Daoist member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, wrote a 
brief commentary on Brecht's poetic image of this scene. The commentary stresses 
that Lao Zi's friendliness and cheerfulness interrupted the principle of equivalent 
exchange by ―rendering a great service as if it were trivial.‖ We might also say, as if 
it were non-calculative, effortless and responsive. Lao Zi, Benjamin continues, thus 
―places these world-historical days under the motto: ‗All right-just a brief stop‘.‖ It is 
the act of an effortless giving and thereby interrupting the journey without leading to 
a standstill that is forcefully conjured up in this anecdote. Capturing the spirit and the 
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specific presenting temporality of effortlessness, Benjamin asks ―and what use would 
his wisdom be if he who forgot the valley (which he had just looked on with pleasure 
again) when he rounded the next corner did not also forget his anxieties about the 
future almost as soon as he felt them?‖47 Critical theory has yet to come to terms with 
the radical potential of such seemingly small, spontaneous, effortless, friendly, 
forgetful and anxiety-free acts in the midst of precarious times.  
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